The rise in unemployment is often blamed not only on the slowdown in economic growth but also on the increasing pressure to rationalise. Greater rationalisation should, however, have led to an increase in labour productivity, but this has not happened in the Federal Republic of Germany nor in a series of other major industrial countries. Instead, there has been a marked slowdown in the rate of productivity advance.
O
verall labour productivity in the Federal Republic of Germany was still rising at an annual average rate of 4. 4 % from 1960 4 % from to 1973 4 % from . Between 1973 4 % from and 1980 the rate of increase came to only 2.6 %. Although the pace of productivity gains is distorted by cyclical differences between the two periods, a comparison of years at similar points in the cycle confirms the decline in the rate of growth. For example, in 1973 productivity rose by 4.6 % in relation to the previous year, but in 1979 it increased by only 3.2 % in spite of the fact that both years saw an upswing of a similar magnitude. By the end of the seventies the productivity gain in a year of upswing was no larger than what had been achieved in downturns during the sixties. The tendency for productivity gains to diminish emerges even more clearly from a comparison of the recession years 1967, 1975 and 1981 , in which real national product showed an absolute decline -the rates of labour productivity growth in these years were 3.2 %, 1.6 % and 0.6 % respectively.
As well as economic reasons, politological and sociological factors are being given increasingly as the causes of this slowdown in productivity growth. The economic reasons include, for example, the structural shift in economic emphasis from the secondary to the tertiary sector, the slower expansion of the capital stock and its increasing obsolescence as a result of the weakness of investment, the lack of technological innovation and the absence of growth markets. The sociological and politological attempts to explain the phenomenon can be grouped under the heading of social sclerosis: according to this view, the state, the workers and the employers in the industrial countries are no longer prepared or no longer able to respond flexibly to variations in economic conditions, so that the * HWWA-Institut fL~r Wirtschaftsforschung-Hambu rg. necessary structural change is delayed or does not occur at all 1. In particular, governments are accused of impeding the necessary structural change that promotes productivity by pursuing a conservative structural policy. Moreover, their social and taxation policies are considered to be at fault for providing little incentive for a voluntary change in the economic structures determined by supply and demand.
This reasoning is carried a step further at the microeconomic level: it is claimed that the desire for greater certainty is bringing firms' time horizons ever closer, in other words that their profit strategies are being orientated towards increasingly short-term results. The long-term aspects of business decisions are being neglected, regardless of the fact that in the past it was precisely the long-term prospects that made large productivity gains possible.
.Eiovernment measures on the one hand and the rise in living standards on the other have allegedly altered workers' behaviour patterns that determine productivity. They are less willing to be mobile in geographic and occupational terms and at the same time the quality of work has deteriorated. In the USA the extent of trade union organisation is also under discussion as a determining factor 2.
In view of the abundance of explanations for the change in productivity, there has been no lack of attempts to test selected determinants empirically for individual economies. Up to now this has been done mainly by examining individual countries in isolation, an exercise that has not brought satisfactory results. Many of the so-called explanations have entailed a greater or lesser degree of speculation. Hence, a multi-country ,.oo comparison seeking to identify factors that might have 3so had the same or similar effects on productivity growth in several economies would seem to offer a greater 3oo chance of success. In order to arrive at a better 25O explanation of developments in Germany, it would seem appropriate to draw a comparison with the USA, the economic leader, and with Japan, the country 20g-universally regarded as having the most impressive record in recent years.
Narrowing Differences
In the period from 1960 to 1973 the rise in labour productivity in Germany was 4.4 % a year, twice the rate recorded in the USA (2.1%) but only half that in Japan (9.1%). After 1973 the order remained the same, but productivity gains in the USA and Japan slowed down even more markedly than in Germany (see Figure 1 ). In the USA productivity all but stagnated, while in Japan it rose by 2.8 %, barely more than the gain recorded in Germany (2.6 %).
Rates of productivity growth should not, however, be viewed without reference to the level of productivity attained. In order to permit comparison, the American and Japanese productivity figures evaluated at 1970 prices must be converted into Deutsche Mark at an appropriate exchange rate. If the figures are converted on the basis of 1970 exchange rates, it will be seen that the USA ranks above Germany and Germany above Japan throughout the period, but that the differences have narrowed over time (see Figure 2) .
A productivity comparison based on the purchasing power and exchange rates of a given year will only present a reliable picture, however, if exchange rate developments are in keeping with the differences in inflation rates, in other words if the real exchange rate remains constant 3. This was not in fact the case. After 1970 the dollar was devalued against the Deutsche Mark and the yen by much more than would have been justified by the inflation differentials. If the level of productivity in the USA is converted not at the 1970 exchange rate but at the real exchange rate for each year, it emerges that productivity in Germany was already higher than in the USA by 1978. Even after the a Converted at the exchange rate ruling in 1970; b Converted on the basis of the real exchange rate (the prevailing exchange rate multiplied by the GDP price deflator of the foreign country and divided by the GDP price deflator of the Federal Republic of Germany). Sources: see Figure 1 .
